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For the last two years, the government of the state of Selangor in Malaysia has attempted
to navigate its way through the Malaysian court system; questioning the constitutionality of
re-delineation of electoral boundaries in the state by the Malaysian Elections Commission.
This would appear seemingly straightforward as a constitutional question to be determined
by the courts vis-à-vis judicial review. The reality, however, is much more bleak. It appears
that the Election Commission’s actions can remain largely unchallenged, not only through
ouster clauses in particularized elections legislation, but also through the unwillingness of
the judiciary to recognize the importance of the constitutional question relating to fair and
equitable electoral management.
A Single-Party Rule and Redrawing Boundaries: What’s
the Issue?
Malaysia has had a single-party rule since its independence in 1957. By way of
background, the ruling political party in Malaysia is Barisan Nasional (The National Front), a
center-right coalition of eleven political parties; it is the largest party in the Malaysian
Parliament, ruling the country since our independence. With political ideologies that
centered on ‘ketuanan Melayu’ (Malay preeminence), social conservatism, and increasing
intolerance towards minority communities, which has intensified in the last ten years,
Barisan Nasional (BN) appeared to be (in my opinion) no longer a stable and viable leader
to govern Malaysia. However, even with a more liberal, but none less corrupt opposition
coalition as the alternative, Malaysians are caught between a rock and a hard place.
The strife between political rivals in Malaysia is more deeply grounded in the facets of its
multi-racial communities. This characteristic, the multi-culturalist dynamics in Malaysia, that
was once its reigning pride and joy, has, for some time now, been the subject of internal
strife, pitting religion and race against each other. In light of the 1MDB international scandal
allegedly involving the Malaysian Prime Minister and several other high- ranking officials in
government, faith in the present government by a number of factions (particularly amongst
the large numbers of urban youth) is at an all time low.
But I write now, not of election controversies over billboards placed by opposition parties
that openly criticized the ruling political party in government. I write not of alleged
corruption, the 1MDB Scandal, in which the current Malaysian government’s investment
arm, 1MDB, was alleged to have been involved in corruption and siphoning of public funds
in the amount of approximately US$1.3 billion. I write not of blatant name-calling and finger
pointing, and the stifling of freedom of speech by an overly paranoid government.
I write of the weakness of the Malaysian Elections Commission (EC), which makes its
actions unquestionable, its role a travesty of bias, its actions protected by legislative ouster
clauses, and the exclusion of judicial review from its jurisdiction. The deplorable side of
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political campaigning and electoral management has reared its ugly head numerous times;
and the EC, tasked with the responsibility of maintaining fair and equitable elections, has
proven itself to be nothing more than a toothless tiger, scurrying in the shadows of the
ruling party.
The EC was, in fact, embroiled in a legal action brought by the Selangor state government
since 2016, on its on-going re-delineation process of constituent maps, fighting off
allegations that it was in collusion with the ruling government for the forthcoming national
general elections. The claim brought by the Selangor state government in the courts was
that the EC’s re-delineation process was unconstitutional in nature and in violation of
Malaysia’s Federal Constitution, for the following reasons: first, that there was mal-
apportionment and gerrymandering in certain constituencies; secondly, that the names of at
least 100,000 voters were missing because the EC did not rely on the latest, most updated
electoral roll to conduct the re-delineation exercise; and thirdly, that the EC’s notice to
redraw the electoral boundaries did not contain adequate information. This, in fact, was
also not the first time that the EC had been subject to misgivings; a coalition of non-
governmental organizations named Bersih, called for clean and fair elections and a reform
of the electoral process, and threw the EC under scrutiny from 2011.
The EC’s recent decision to hold the general elections on the 9  of May 2018, falling on a
weekday (Wednesday), was also subject to some hue and cry. The Malaysian diaspora,
particularly living in countries like Singapore and Thailand (where postal voting during the
elections was not an available option) would likely face some difficulty in returning home to
the country mid-week, to vote in their respective constituencies. A more concerning issue
was the EC’s recent decision to again redraw the election boundaries in the state of
Selangor, a Pakatan Harapan (opposition party) stronghold, weeks ahead of the dissolution
of Parliament. The Malaysian Parliament passed on the new electoral maps on 28  March
2018; the effect of the re-delineated boundaries is an imbalance in constituencies,
prompting allegations of mal-apportionment and gerrymandering. (The decision to pass on
the new electoral boundaries was made notwithstanding the pending legal action by the
Selangor state government before the courts).
The Constitutional Challenge: Wither Away Judicial
Review?
In February this year, the Selangor state government finally met its defeat in the aforesaid
legal action before the courts. At the Court of Appeal, the claim was dismissed on the
grounds that the EC’s re-delineation exercise could not be challenged by way of judicial
review; although the court also acknowledged that the EC failed to provide rebuttal
evidence to some of the grounds raised by the Selangor state government. The Selangor
state government thereafter filed an application before the Federal Court, the apex court of
Malaysia. At the Federal Court, the three-judge bench upheld the decision that “EC
recommendations for a re-delineation exercise in parliamentary and state constituencies
was not amendable to judicial review.” A statement made by the EC chairman following this
decision lauded the “recognition involving the separation of powers between the executive,
legislative and judiciary branches in the country.” This is laughable, to say the least: the
exclusion of judicial review to act as a check-and-balance for executive acts, is, in itself, a
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contravention of the purpose of separation of powers. In any case, scholars believe that
this issue is likely to become moot, as the judiciary has shown itself unwilling to interfere in
the legality of executive acts in the past, and judicial review in Malaysia vis-à-vis Article 121
of the Federal Constitution has been considerably tamed since the Malaysian constitutional
crisis in 1988. The significance of the effect of Article 121 is that the judiciary is subject to
“such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.” This, in itself, is
a flawed concept that would hamper an independent judiciary from exercising its judicial
powers.
The bitter taste that has been left in the mouth following the Federal Court’s decision
prompts one to ask the question: if the EC’s recommendations for a re-delineation exercise
results in the inevitable outcome of increasing one political party’s opportunity for success
over another, or if the EC had failed to provide rebuttal evidence to the claims made by the
Selangor state government (as had been acknowledged by the Court of Appeal), how does
it then become possible to exclude judicial review from this equation? Logic, and certainly,
common law rules of equity must prevail, particularly so when the allegations of ultra vires
by a public body, impact the citizens at large. In Malaysia, Section 96 of the Court of
Judicature Act of 1964 requires that “legal or constitutional questions of public importance”
must be framed before the apex court may hear the case. Would an imbalance in
constituencies in the electoral process therefore not be regarded as a “constitutional
question of public importance”? Furthermore, Section 9A of the Malaysian Elections Act
1958 remains a highly controversial legislative provision, because it emboldens the EC with
absolute power in ultimately framing and controlling the electoral roll: “….the electoral roll
shall be deemed to be final and binding and shall not be questioned or appealed against in,
or reviewed, quashed or set aside by, any court.” The effect of this provision means that the
electoral roll relied upon cannot be challenged at all; in substance, even if there was any
elements of fraud or irregularity If the electoral roll cannot be challenged by judicial review
at all, and may thereby lead to unfair outcomes in the subsequent elections, I fail to
understand why this is not regarded as a “constitutional question of public importance.”
It is recognized that judicial review is concerned with the legality of the action, and not the
merits of the case; but the position taken by the Court of Appeal, and the Federal Court,
has failed to appreciate why the constitutionality of the EC’s actions was raised in the first
place, and why, above all, judicial review cannot be excluded from this purview: it seems
simple to glean that the inability to challenge the EC would be a violation of not only the
principle of separation of powers, but also the fundamental right of citizens to participate in
the democratic processes of their country, in accordance with the guarantees under the
Federal Constitution.
There is no reason why matters relating to electoral processes cannot be subject to judicial
review. In Bush v Gore in the United States, the Supreme Court held that a conflict
regarding the manual recounting of votes in Florida under its laws, to meet “safe harbor”
deadlines, was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it would significantly affect the outcomes of either a Republican or a
Democrat victory. In the United Kingdom, with the exception of Northern Ireland, a complex
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set of legislative acts govern elections and electoral processes, as well as statutory
instruments, regulations and orders; these were made in response to “allegations and
confirmed cases of electoral fraud in previous elections.”
Malaysia: Parallel to my Hungarian Home?
In my adopted home in Hungary, some Hungarian scholars are as pessimistic of the role of
its Constitutional Court, as I am regarding the role of judicial review in Malaysia. It alarms
me, that the judiciary as an important constitutional organ in a country has lost its will to
counter-veil the role of political power and its ability to influence a democracy.
Almost two weeks ago, I followed the news of Hungary’s elections in Budapest, waiting with
bated breath; wanting to believe in my heart that liberal democracy is not dead. But I
watched my Hungarian friends and colleagues collapse into disenchantment, as the ruling
political party in Hungary, Fidesz, won a resounding constitutional supermajority in the
elections, retaining its political foothold in the country. In one fell swoop, I felt deeply for my
fellow Hungarians; and also for myself, for my Malaysia.
With Malaysia’s upcoming general elections on the 9  of May 2018 and a political
environment similar to Hungary’s, this empathy is made much more acute because the
depth of emotions stirred within, seemed to me, the tolling death knell of the sanctity of the
rule of law, of safeguarded constitutional values and principles, and a belief in modern
democracy. I cannot help but feel a sense of foreboding and unsettling familiarity reaching
its deft fingers into my concerns for Malaysia’s upcoming general elections.
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